By Joe Plenzler, co-host of Meidas Defense
In the shadow of a conflict now nearly a month old, the American military machine is once again operating at full tilt in the Middle East. To the casual observer, the daily briefings from the Pentagon suggest a familiar, almost rhythmic progression: sorties flown, naval assets “neutralized,” and “targets serviced.” But for those who have walked the desert sands before—like Dr. Ben Connable, a retired Marine Corps intelligence officer—the current air of confidence feels dangerously unanchored from reality.
As we mark the 23rd anniversary of the invasion of Iraq, the comparisons are worrying. While the “shock and awe” of 2026 may look like a repeat of 2003, Connable warns that we are missing the “interconnected brain” of expertise—allies, academia, and a unified Department of Defense—that attempted to navigate the complexities of Iraq and Afghanistan. Today, the strategy seems to be held by a dangerously small circle in the White House, operating without the guardrails of a clear, achievable objective.
The Problem of “Input Metrics”
The administration has leaned heavily on the “American way of assessment”: counting what we’ve destroyed rather than what we’ve achieved. We are told the Iranian Navy has been “obliterated,” yet this ignores the asymmetric reality of Iranian doctrine. A billion-dollar destroyer can be “neutralized” by a $50,000 speedboat or a handful of limpet mines. These are not just weapons; they are economic tools capable of shifting global insurance rates and closing the Strait of Hormuz for a long time as Iran seeks to impose maximum costs on the United States for the attacks.
If the objective is to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, as some suggest, Connable argues this isn’t a strategic goal—it’s a “permanent condition” requiring perpetual enforcement. By presenting the Iranian regime with an existential threat, we haven’t deterred their nuclear ambitions; we have likely accelerated them. In the logic of survival, a nuclear deterrent is the only thing that keeps a regime like the IRGC from the fate of Saddam Hussein or Muammar Gaddafi.
The “Slippery Slope” of the Ground War
Perhaps most concerning is the looming specter of boots on the ground. The administration may hope that air power alone will force a strategic shift, but history—from Vietnam to Iraq—suggests otherwise. If the U.S. moves to secure critical nodes like the port of Bandar Abbas, the math changes instantly.
Securing a perimeter large enough to protect an airfield from tube artillery and small drones requires a massive footprint. We aren’t talking about a quick strike; we are talking about holding territory the size of Ramadi, populated by half a million people, against an entrenched “Basij” paramilitary force of unknown numbers.
“Just because they’re going to lose doesn’t mean they’re not going to fight,” Connable notes. Even a “destroyed” army can fire a hidden artillery piece or launch a low-tech drone that results in flag-draped coffins.
The Missing Coalition
Unlike the lead-up to the Iraq War, there was no UN resolution, no “coalition of the willing,” and no formal case made to the American public from the Oval Office. Instead, we have a war conducted via recorded video from Mar-a-Lago, leaving the American public—and even the MAGA movement—split on the necessity of another “forever war.”
As the conflict enters its second month, the “Sword of Damocles” remains: Iran’s untapped capabilities in terror and cyber warfare. Their restraint thus far is likely tactical, not a sign of weakness. If the administration continues to push without a clear “off-ramp” or a defined end-state, they may find themselves in a trap of their own making—unable to leave without leaving a vacuum, and unable to stay without incurring a cost the American public is not prepared to pay.
The lesson of the last twenty years is simple but ignored: Complexity isn’t a variable to be managed; it’s a reality that, if misunderstood, leads inevitably to the quagmire.
